Discussion:
Never One Thing
(too old to reply)
Yellow
2018-06-05 17:18:19 UTC
Permalink
Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming the
cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
been caused by more than one thing?

1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
put' in flats.

2. No sprinklers.

3. Firefighters should have directed their hoses on or above the fire,
but videos show they were being targeted below.

4. A pipe system to get water up the 24-storey block could not cope and
was overloaded - leaving the upper floors, where most people died,
vulnerable.

5. Water pipe failure meant fire crews had to pump their own water onto
the fire.

6. The failure of the fire lift system delayed firefighters.

7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
adhered to for another 80 minutes.

8. Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled
'substantially to blame'.

9. Two types of cladding and four different insulation layers did not
comply with building regulations.

10. Two cavity barriers did not have the required fire performance
certificates.

11. The cladding produced toxic smoke that slowed the firefighters as it
forced them to wear breathing apparatus.

12. Designers and builders had no idea how the cladding system would
perform in a fire as no tests were carried out.

13. Neither the London Fire Brigade nor Kensington and Chelsea Tenant
Management Organisation, which was responsible for Grenfell, carried out
risk assessments of the cladding.

14. Flammable aluminium panels fixed to the tower and on more than 300
other blocks across England were never subjected to a full British
Standard fire test.

15. Stairwell was too narrow and soon became impassable thanks to smoke,
darkness, firefighters and distressed and dying victims.

16. An architectural feature called a 'crown' at the top of the building
caught fire and also helped the blaze spread horizontally.

17. Design of tower blocks is supposed to 'compartmentalise' fires into
individual flats - but this was not effective at Grenfell.

18. Ventilation system for removing smoke from lobbies failed.

19. Fire stops between each floor were not installed correctly, meaning
nothing stopped the blaze leaping up the tower.

20. A 'culture of non-compliance' appeared to exist in the maintenance
of the tower.

21. Most of the fire doors leading to the 120 flats were relatively new
but did not comply with building regulations.

22. Some doors failed within 20 minutes even though they should have
blocked fire for an hour.

23. Doors were fitted with a variety of different locks, hinges and
letter plates that could significantly reduce fire resistance.

24. Forty-eight doors had glazing that failed and allowed flames and
smoke to pass directly through.

25. Fourteen of the doors to Grenfell's flats were of unknown origin.

26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
fire to spread more quickly.

27. Doors were left open by fire hoses and in one case, a body.

28. Defective windows installed in the 2012-16 refurbishment allowed the
fire to spread from a single kitchen to the external cladding through
gaps in frames.

29. Windows had no fire-resistant cavity barriers encasing them and
these openings were surrounded by combustible material.

30. During refurbishment, the windows were fitted in an 'improvised
manner' that may have made them less safe.
R. Mark Clayton
2018-06-06 09:55:13 UTC
Permalink
On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
> Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming the
> cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> been caused by more than one thing?
>
> 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
> blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
> put' in flats.

Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and only four storeys).

>
> 2. No sprinklers.

Not a requirement.

>
> 3. Firefighters should have directed their hoses on or above the fire,
> but videos show they were being targeted below.

I think they went as high as they could reach.

>
> 4. A pipe system to get water up the 24-storey block could not cope and
> was overloaded - leaving the upper floors, where most people died,
> vulnerable.

There would be a fire dry riser, but it did not have the capacity for a fire of this scale.

>
> 5. Water pipe failure meant fire crews had to pump their own water onto
> the fire.

This is normal.

>
> 6. The failure of the fire lift system delayed firefighters.

Serious issue.

>
> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> adhered to for another 80 minutes.

With hindsight this looks like a major mistake.

>
> 8. Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled
> 'substantially to blame'.

The report says that, and IMO it is true, however it is not yet a conclusion of the inquiry.

>
> 9. Two types of cladding and four different insulation layers did not
> comply with building regulations.

Allegedly.

>
> 10. Two cavity barriers did not have the required fire performance
> certificates.

Ditto, but this looks very likely to be true.

>
> 11. The cladding produced toxic smoke that slowed the firefighters as it
> forced them to wear breathing apparatus.

True, likely anyway and they would anyway.

>
> 12. Designers and builders had no idea how the cladding system would
> perform in a fire as no tests were carried out.
>
> 13. Neither the London Fire Brigade nor Kensington and Chelsea Tenant
> Management Organisation, which was responsible for Grenfell, carried out
> risk assessments of the cladding.
>
> 14. Flammable aluminium panels fixed to the tower and on more than 300
> other blocks across England were never subjected to a full British
> Standard fire test.
>
> 15. Stairwell was too narrow and soon became impassable thanks to smoke,
> darkness, firefighters and distressed and dying victims.
>
> 16. An architectural feature called a 'crown' at the top of the building
> caught fire and also helped the blaze spread horizontally.
>
> 17. Design of tower blocks is supposed to 'compartmentalise' fires into
> individual flats - but this was not effective at Grenfell.

Poor fire doors and stud partition internal walls (on the plans I have seen).

>
> 18. Ventilation system for removing smoke from lobbies failed.
>
> 19. Fire stops between each floor were not installed correctly, meaning
> nothing stopped the blaze leaping up the tower.
>
> 20. A 'culture of non-compliance' appeared to exist in the maintenance
> of the tower.
>
> 21. Most of the fire doors leading to the 120 flats were relatively new
> but did not comply with building regulations.

They were supposed to survive 30 minutes, but did not.

>
> 22. Some doors failed within 20 minutes even though they should have
> blocked fire for an hour.

Not sure they were meant to be one hour doors.

>
> 23. Doors were fitted with a variety of different locks, hinges and
> letter plates that could significantly reduce fire resistance.

This is what occupiers do.

>
> 24. Forty-eight doors had glazing that failed and allowed flames and
> smoke to pass directly through.

Same as 21.

>
> 25. Fourteen of the doors to Grenfell's flats were of unknown origin.

Probably replaced by occupiers.

>
> 26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
> fire to spread more quickly.

Occupiers tend to disconnect the closers as happens in my block.

>
> 27. Doors were left open by fire hoses and in one case, a body.

Due to problems with the riser the fire brigade ran hoses up the stairs, worsening the congestion in 15.

>
> 28. Defective windows installed in the 2012-16 refurbishment allowed the
> fire to spread from a single kitchen to the external cladding through
> gaps in frames.
>
> 29. Windows had no fire-resistant cavity barriers encasing them and
> these openings were surrounded by combustible material.

Essentially the same, this allowed the fire in the skin to penetrate into the flats from the outside.

>
> 30. During refurbishment, the windows were fitted in an 'improvised
> manner' that may have made them less safe.

as above.

There will be a lot of blame shifting during the inquiry, some errors are systemic, such as no fire tests on the cladding, others like not ordering early evacuation were errors of judgement on the night.
GB
2018-06-06 10:26:06 UTC
Permalink
It's interesting that these tall concrete blocks have been up around 60
years in this country. As originally designed, they were pretty safe.
Certainly, fire was thought about at the design stage, and the blocks
built accordingly.

It worked. Until quite recently, there have been relatively few fire
fatalities in these blocks.

But then, priorities changed. One block I had a flat in had smoke
louvres permanently open on all the landings. That was great from a fire
point of view, but obviously the landings were freezing. So, the LA
'improved' the block by boarding over the louvres.

Adding insulation on the outside (so as not to make the flats smaller)
was logical, but adding *flammable* insulation was not.

And so on. Over the years, the effect of the bad decisions has accumulated.
Incubus
2018-06-06 10:31:00 UTC
Permalink
On 2018-06-06, GB <***@microsoft.com> wrote:
> It's interesting that these tall concrete blocks have been up around 60 years
> in this country. As originally designed, they were pretty safe. Certainly,
> fire was thought about at the design stage, and the blocks built accordingly.
>
> It worked. Until quite recently, there have been relatively few fire
> fatalities in these blocks.
>
> But then, priorities changed. One block I had a flat in had smoke louvres
> permanently open on all the landings. That was great from a fire point of
> view, but obviously the landings were freezing. So, the LA 'improved' the
> block by boarding over the louvres.
>
> Adding insulation on the outside (so as not to make the flats smaller) was
> logical, but adding *flammable* insulation was not.
>
> And so on. Over the years, the effect of the bad decisions has accumulated.

And now, following the accretion of bad decisions, populist policies were
granted such as illegal immigrants occupying the flats in question being granted
amnesty or being homed in luxury hotels in an area of the UK that precious few
people who actually work for a living can afford to reside in.
Yellow
2018-06-06 12:28:23 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 11:26:06 +0100, GB <***@microsoft.com> posted:
>
> It's interesting that these tall concrete blocks have been up around 60
> years in this country. As originally designed, they were pretty safe.
> Certainly, fire was thought about at the design stage, and the blocks
> built accordingly.
>
> It worked. Until quite recently, there have been relatively few fire
> fatalities in these blocks.
>
> But then, priorities changed. One block I had a flat in had smoke
> louvres permanently open on all the landings. That was great from a fire
> point of view, but obviously the landings were freezing. So, the LA
> 'improved' the block by boarding over the louvres.
>
> Adding insulation on the outside (so as not to make the flats smaller)
> was logical, but adding *flammable* insulation was not.
>
> And so on. Over the years, the effect of the bad decisions has accumulated.

Yes - I agree. They have changed things for particular reasons without
considering the over all consequences.
R. Mark Clayton
2018-06-07 09:33:05 UTC
Permalink
On Wednesday, 6 June 2018 11:26:10 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> It's interesting that these tall concrete blocks have been up around 60
> years in this country. As originally designed, they were pretty safe.
> Certainly, fire was thought about at the design stage, and the blocks
> built accordingly.

Indeed - very robustly built. Concrete floors and often block walls.

There was a gas explosion and consequent fire half way up one in Manchester a few years ago - fire did not spread to other flats.

>
> It worked. Until quite recently, there have been relatively few fire
> fatalities in these blocks.
>
> But then, priorities changed. One block I had a flat in had smoke
> louvres permanently open on all the landings. That was great from a fire
> point of view, but obviously the landings were freezing. So, the LA
> 'improved' the block by boarding over the louvres.
>
> Adding insulation on the outside (so as not to make the flats smaller)
> was logical, but adding *flammable* insulation was not.
>
> And so on. Over the years, the effect of the bad decisions has accumulated.
Tim Woodall
2018-06-06 11:23:56 UTC
Permalink
On 2018-06-06, R. Mark Clayton <***@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
>>
>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>
> With hindsight this looks like a major mistake.
>

This is a common and endemic problem (failing to give up on the plans
and just get everyone out)

Unfortunately, in this case, the hesitancy to make the call 'nothing is
working, just get everyone out' was catastrophic to life.

But how many times have we heard of people being trapped in a train for
hours and hours, sometimes within sight of a platform, because someone
won't make the call and stop the trains to allow the stranded train to
be evacuated. After all, the problem *might* be resolved soon.

>> 8. Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled
>> 'substantially to blame'.
>
> The report says that, and IMO it is true, however it is not yet a
> conclusion of the inquiry.
>

I don't know about the tower in particular but building regs *require*
insulation to be added when significant works are done to external
walls.

I got bitten by this when I needed a wall replastered due to damp and
being forced to install insulation as a result - something I didn't want
to do at all. In my case, I didn't install the cheapest but, instead,
the thinnest (as it had to go on the inside)

It's possible that the regulations that allowed the cladding to be used
were also requiring something to be done. In which case I can see a
discussion along the lines of 'we don't want to do this at all but we
have to. What is the cheapest possible way of complying with the law?'

>>
>> 26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
>> fire to spread more quickly.
>
> Occupiers tend to disconnect the closers as happens in my block.
>

In fact, self closers are no longer required on most internal doors. It
was finally accepted that those who didn't disconnect them would
typically wedge the door open instead (particularly doors to kitchens)
and that then made closing the door harder in the event of a fire.

They are still required on the main door to a flat but many people do
disconnect them.
GB
2018-06-06 12:46:19 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 12:23, Tim Woodall wrote:
> On 2018-06-06, R. Mark Clayton <***@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
>>>
>>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>>
>> With hindsight this looks like a major mistake.
>>
>
> This is a common and endemic problem (failing to give up on the plans
> and just get everyone out)

The same happened with the Twin Towers in NYC.
R. Mark Clayton
2018-06-07 09:38:52 UTC
Permalink
On Wednesday, 6 June 2018 13:46:22 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 12:23, Tim Woodall wrote:
> > On 2018-06-06, R. Mark Clayton <***@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
> >>>
> >>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> >>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> >>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
> >>
> >> With hindsight this looks like a major mistake.
> >>
> >
> > This is a common and endemic problem (failing to give up on the plans
> > and just get everyone out)
>
> The same happened with the Twin Towers in NYC.

Actually they were supposed to evacuate, however many people ignored the call and sadly in one tower the plane that hit it physically severed all but one means of escape and the severe fire from several tons of kerosene sprayed over the interior of several floors soon severed that. All part of the terrorists diabolic plan.

The tower were supposed to survive a 1960's two engine plane collision for an hour. One managed 57 minutes the other slightly over an hour.
tim...
2018-06-06 19:06:50 UTC
Permalink
"Tim Woodall" <***@woodall.me.uk> wrote in message
news:***@einstein.home.woodall.me.uk...
> On 2018-06-06, R. Mark Clayton <***@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
>>>
>>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>>
>> With hindsight this looks like a major mistake.
>>
>
> This is a common and endemic problem (failing to give up on the plans
> and just get everyone out)
>
> Unfortunately, in this case, the hesitancy to make the call 'nothing is
> working, just get everyone out' was catastrophic to life.
>
> But how many times have we heard of people being trapped in a train for
> hours and hours, sometimes within sight of a platform, because someone
> won't make the call and stop the trains to allow the stranded train to
> be evacuated. After all, the problem *might* be resolved soon.
>
>>> 8. Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled
>>> 'substantially to blame'.
>>
>> The report says that, and IMO it is true, however it is not yet a
>> conclusion of the inquiry.
>>
>
> I don't know about the tower in particular but building regs *require*
> insulation to be added when significant works are done to external
> walls.
>
> I got bitten by this when I needed a wall replastered due to damp and
> being forced to install insulation as a result - something I didn't want
> to do at all. In my case, I didn't install the cheapest but, instead,
> the thinnest (as it had to go on the inside)
>
> It's possible that the regulations that allowed the cladding to be used
> were also requiring something to be done. In which case I can see a
> discussion along the lines of 'we don't want to do this at all but we
> have to. What is the cheapest possible way of complying with the law?'

I don't think that the case here

The raison d'être for putting on the cladding seems to be the improved
insulation

that it made the block look prettier was a secondary bonus

>>> 26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
>>> fire to spread more quickly.
>>
>> Occupiers tend to disconnect the closers as happens in my block.
>>
>
> In fact, self closers are no longer required on most internal doors. It
> was finally accepted that those who didn't disconnect them would
> typically wedge the door open instead (particularly doors to kitchens)
> and that then made closing the door harder in the event of a fire.
>
> They are still required on the main door to a flat but many people do
> disconnect them.

I've taken mine off. Right PITA it was. And to what benefit is it there?

It's my front door. For general security reasons I'm going to close it
whenever I am not actually passing through it. But having it try to close
itself when I am half way through achieves(/ed) nothing.

tim






>
Yellow
2018-06-06 12:26:53 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 02:55:13 -0700 (PDT), R. Mark Clayton
<***@gmail.com> posted:
>
> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming the
> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> > been caused by more than one thing?
> >
> > 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
> > blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
> > put' in flats.
>
> Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and only four storeys).
>
> >
> > 2. No sprinklers.
>
> Not a requirement.

You are missing the point of the list, which is about the reason why
what happened happened with a view to altering the law.

<snip>
tim...
2018-06-06 19:09:00 UTC
Permalink
"Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 02:55:13 -0700 (PDT), R. Mark Clayton
> <***@gmail.com> posted:
>>
>> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
>> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming
>> > the
>> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
>> > been caused by more than one thing?
>> >
>> > 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
>> > blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
>> > put' in flats.
>>
>> Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and only
>> four storeys).
>>
>> >
>> > 2. No sprinklers.
>>
>> Not a requirement.
>
> You are missing the point of the list, which is about the reason why
> what happened happened with a view to altering the law.

not really

the non-requirement for sprinklers is because it is considered that the rest
of the Building Regs make the building safe from a fire.

which they do/did when the building was first built.

It's the badly designed alterations that changed that

tim
Yellow
2018-06-06 21:01:40 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 20:09:00 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
posted:
>
> "Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
> news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> > On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 02:55:13 -0700 (PDT), R. Mark Clayton
> > <***@gmail.com> posted:
> >>
> >> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
> >> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming
> >> > the
> >> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> >> > been caused by more than one thing?
> >> >
> >> > 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
> >> > blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
> >> > put' in flats.
> >>
> >> Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and only
> >> four storeys).
> >>
> >> >
> >> > 2. No sprinklers.
> >>
> >> Not a requirement.
> >
> > You are missing the point of the list, which is about the reason why
> > what happened happened with a view to altering the law.
>
> not really

Yes really.

> the non-requirement for sprinklers is because it is considered that the rest
> of the Building Regs make the building safe from a fire.

Except the rest of the building, on the day, was not safe - was it?

Regulations are all well and good but the only way to be sure a
particular building will not burn or a particular fire will not spread
is to set fire to it and see what happens - which of course cannot be
done. This is why you have to consider other measures, even if on paper
they would appear superfluous.

It is never one thing that causes these sorts of tragedies but it can
sometimes be one thing that prevents them.


> which they do/did when the building was first built.
>
> It's the badly designed alterations that changed that

Which is why it is right to consider whether sprinklers should be fitted
to buildings over a certain hight and that is why they are on the list.
tim...
2018-06-07 07:12:02 UTC
Permalink
"Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 20:09:00 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
> posted:
>>
>> "Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
>> news:***@News.Individual.NET...
>> > On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 02:55:13 -0700 (PDT), R. Mark Clayton
>> > <***@gmail.com> posted:
>> >>
>> >> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
>> >> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming
>> >> > the
>> >> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to
>> >> > have
>> >> > been caused by more than one thing?
>> >> >
>> >> > 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in
>> >> > tower
>> >> > blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents
>> >> > 'staying
>> >> > put' in flats.
>> >>
>> >> Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and
>> >> only
>> >> four storeys).
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > 2. No sprinklers.
>> >>
>> >> Not a requirement.
>> >
>> > You are missing the point of the list, which is about the reason why
>> > what happened happened with a view to altering the law.
>>
>> not really
>
> Yes really.

No, really.

>> the non-requirement for sprinklers is because it is considered that the
>> rest
>> of the Building Regs make the building safe from a fire.
>
> Except the rest of the building, on the day, was not safe - was it?

The building didn't have sprinklers installed by design, because it was safe
without them, by design.

It was the alterations made to it that were unsafe.

It is nonsense to argue that you can "make unsafe alterations to a building
if you retro-install a sprinkler system"

The solution ought to be "you can only make alterations to a building that
are safe"

> Regulations are all well and good but the only way to be sure a
> particular building will not burn or a particular fire will not spread
> is to set fire to it and see what happens

well now you are arguing that unmodified buildings, building to current
controlled standards might be unsafe.

there is no evidence to support that. There have been previous fires in
high rise apartments and the "containment" process has worked as designed.

> - which of course cannot be
> done. This is why you have to consider other measures, even if on paper
> they would appear superfluous.

It might be a good idea to consider other methods, but that doesn't mean
that you can flag up "lack of sprinkles" as a fault if the current methods
have been proven to work.

tim
The Todal
2018-06-07 09:04:23 UTC
Permalink
On 07/06/2018 08:12, tim... wrote:
>

>
> well now you are arguing that unmodified buildings, building to current
> controlled standards might be unsafe.
>
> there is no evidence to support that.  There have been previous fires in
> high rise apartments and the "containment" process has worked as designed.

I think it is likely to be argued that Grenfell Tower did comply with
building regulations and that the cladding passed the relevant tests.
The inquiry will presumably reach a conclusion on that.

What is clear from the evidence so far is that the staircase - the only
staircase - was too narrow to allow two firement with breathing
apparatus to pass each other, let alone if the staircase is obstructed
with bodies or discarded equipment. Firemen were running out of air from
their breathing apparatus before they had managed to get to the top of
the staircase, or shortly afterwards.

A sprinkler system, as a "belt and braces", would save lives in cases
where the fire could not be confined to individual apartments.
GB
2018-06-07 10:53:03 UTC
Permalink
On 07/06/2018 10:04, The Todal wrote:

> A sprinkler system, as a "belt and braces", would save lives in cases
> where the fire could not be confined to individual apartments.

That's not proven, actually. The thing is that it can work in an
individual flat, or in a couple of flats, but there's no evidence that
it can work in the sort of inferno, fed from outside, that occurred at
Grenfell. Apart from anything else, you'd need a massive water supply to
be able to run all the sprinklers at the same time, as would have been
necessary at Grenfell.

We don't even know whether the original fridge fire in flat 16 that set
fire to the cladding would have been extinguished by a sprinkler.

Besides that, retrofitting sprinklers to existing flats will result in
ugly pipe runs across ceilings. People will get flooded out of their
homes by fires on the floor above or faulty sprinklers. It may even be
possible to drown under a sprinkler!








>
>
>
tim...
2018-06-07 11:58:45 UTC
Permalink
"The Todal" <***@icloud.com> wrote in message
news:***@mid.individual.net...
> On 07/06/2018 08:12, tim... wrote:
>>
>
>>
>> well now you are arguing that unmodified buildings, building to current
>> controlled standards might be unsafe.
>>
>> there is no evidence to support that. There have been previous fires in
>> high rise apartments and the "containment" process has worked as
>> designed.
>
> I think it is likely to be argued that Grenfell Tower did comply with
> building regulations and that the cladding passed the relevant tests.

you've not been watching the same TV analysis as me

because the conclusion that they came to (based upon the enquiry) was that
the cladding, as installed, most definitely did not meet the required
standards. It was way way short of the requirements.

It's that "as installed" part that important here. It exonerates the
cladding manufacturer from blame, but not the rest of the process.

> The inquiry will presumably reach a conclusion on that.
>
> What is clear from the evidence so far is that the staircase - the only
> staircase - was too narrow to allow two firement with breathing apparatus
> to pass each other, let alone if the staircase is obstructed with bodies
> or discarded equipment. Firemen were running out of air from their
> breathing apparatus before they had managed to get to the top of the
> staircase, or shortly afterwards.
>
> A sprinkler system, as a "belt and braces", would save lives in cases
> where the fire could not be confined to individual apartments.

Of course

and were they fitted as standard on all new builds could be very cost
effective.

but they will not be cost effective if they need to be retro fitted.

These two propositions are entirely different (and here we will be dealing
with retro-fitting!)
The Todal
2018-06-08 11:55:21 UTC
Permalink
On 07/06/2018 12:58, tim... wrote:
>
>
> "The Todal" <***@icloud.com> wrote in message
> news:***@mid.individual.net...
>> On 07/06/2018 08:12, tim... wrote:
>>>
>>
>>>
>>> well now you are arguing that unmodified buildings, building to
>>> current controlled standards might be unsafe.
>>>
>>> there is no evidence to support that.  There have been previous fires
>>> in high rise apartments and the "containment" process has worked as
>>> designed.
>>
>> I think it is likely to be argued that Grenfell Tower did comply with
>> building regulations and that the cladding passed the relevant tests.
>
> you've not been watching the same TV analysis as me


So far, nobody appears to have admitted blame, which is to be expected.
Each party is likely to blame another party or another factor. I'm not
saying that this opinion will prevail over the opinions of independent
experts. The Hackitt Report says that the current regulatory system for
ensuring fire safety is not fit for purpose. If that's true, it implies
that the regulations are sufficiently ambiguous and have sufficient
loopholes that it might be possible to argue that you have complied,
even though your building is actually unsafe.

>
> because the conclusion that they came to (based upon the enquiry) was
> that the cladding, as installed, most definitely did not meet the
> required standards.  It was way way short of the requirements.
>
> It's that "as installed" part that important here.  It exonerates the
> cladding manufacturer from blame, but not the rest of the process.

"The company that made the combustible cladding used on Grenfell Tower
has claimed its panels were not responsible for spreading the fire that
killed 72 people, despite expert evidence to the contrary.

Lawyers for the US industrial giant Arconic told the public inquiry on
Tuesday that its panels, which could be seen burning and emitting
showers of molten plastic from their cores, were “at most, a
contributing factor”.

They suggested no one would have died if the windows had been built with
greater fire protection because they would have prevented the flames
spreading."

or to quote from the Arconic statement:

"ACM is only one component in an overall cladding system.. The Company
manufactures and sells unfabricated ACM panels; it does not sell other
components of an overall cladding system. ...At relevant times there was
no legal bar to the use of combustible materials within a cladding
system."

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/evidence/arconic-architectural-products-sas-opening-statement


>
>> The inquiry will presumably reach a conclusion on that.
>>
>> What is clear from the evidence so far is that the staircase - the
>> only staircase - was too narrow to allow two firement with breathing
>> apparatus to pass each other, let alone if the staircase is obstructed
>> with bodies or discarded equipment. Firemen were running out of air
>> from their breathing apparatus before they had managed to get to the
>> top of the staircase, or shortly afterwards.
>>
>> A sprinkler system, as a "belt and braces", would save lives in cases
>> where the fire could not be confined to individual apartments.
>
> Of course
>
> and were they fitted as standard on all new builds could be very cost
> effective.
>
> but they will not be cost effective if they need to be retro fitted.

The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
the economics of a sprinkler system.




>
> These two propositions are entirely different (and here we will be
> dealing with retro-fitting!)
>
>
>
JNugent
2018-06-08 13:18:15 UTC
Permalink
On 08/06/2018 12:55, The Todal wrote:

[ ... ]

> So far, nobody appears to have admitted blame, which is to be expected.
> Each party is likely to blame another party or another factor. I'm not
> saying that this opinion will prevail over the opinions of independent
> experts. The Hackitt Report says that the current regulatory system for
> ensuring fire safety is not fit for purpose. If that's true, it implies
> that the regulations are sufficiently ambiguous and have sufficient
> loopholes that it might be possible to argue that you have complied,
> even though your building is actually unsafe.

If you *have* complied, it should certainly be possible to argue that
you have complied.

That's what compliance is.

The safety of the building is strictly a secondary matter.

>> because the conclusion that they came to (based upon the enquiry) was
>> that the cladding, as installed, most definitely did not meet the
>> required standards. It was way way short of the requirements.

>> It's that "as installed" part that important here. It exonerates the
>> cladding manufacturer from blame, but not the rest of the process.

There must presumably be a lawful purpose for which those tiles would be
used. That they were bought and used for another purpose is hardly the
maker's fault.

[ ... ]

> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
> the economics of a sprinkler system.

Indeed. And all the responsible body needed to do was increase the rent
so as to cover the cost.

That's what I'd have to do if I wanted to install sprinklers in my home:
pay for it myself. And there's nothing wrong with that.
GB
2018-06-08 14:49:14 UTC
Permalink
On 08/06/2018 14:18, JNugent wrote:


>> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
>> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
>> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
>> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
>> the economics of a sprinkler system.
>
> Indeed. And all the responsible body needed to do was increase the rent
> so as to cover the cost.
>
> That's what I'd have to do if I wanted to install sprinklers in my home:
> pay for it myself. And there's nothing wrong with that.
>
>

But, from WP:

"While there was much criticism of the lack of fire sprinkler systems,
Geoff Wilkinson, the building regulations columnist for the Architects'
Journal, wrote on 14 June 2017 that if a gas riser was leaking or the
cladding was at fault, sprinklers would have had little effect. He also
said that reports of combustible material stored in the common walkways
suggested poor overall management.[281] David Siber, an advisor to the
Fire Brigades Union, said sprinklers would have prevented the fire, if
it started in a kitchen, from ever spreading beyond that room.[282]"


As Tim says, there's a major issue about supplying water to sprinklers
in all the flats at the same time.

To put that in perspective, each sprinkler needs around 35-40 litres of
water per minute. You need two sprinklers per room, so say 350 l/min for
each flat.

A dry riser, with water pumped from one or two fire engines, can supply
around 1200 l/min, ie less than enough for 4 flats. So, to power all the
sprinklers in Grenfell at once, would have required over 30 dry risers
(they'd actually have to be wet risers), 30 high power pumps, simply
massive water mains, major electricity supplies etc. It clearly would be
hopelessly impracticable.

Of course, the hope is that the sprinkler would have put the original
fire out without it spreading to the cladding. But, if it had spread to
the cladding, no practical sprinkler system would have helped.
The Todal
2018-06-08 15:21:44 UTC
Permalink
On 08/06/2018 15:49, GB wrote:
> On 08/06/2018 14:18, JNugent wrote:
>
>
>>> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
>>> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
>>> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
>>> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
>>> the economics of a sprinkler system.
>>
>> Indeed. And all the responsible body needed to do was increase the
>> rent so as to cover the cost.
>>
>> That's what I'd have to do if I wanted to install sprinklers in my
>> home: pay for it myself. And there's nothing wrong with that.
>>
>>
>
> But, from WP:
>
> "While there was much criticism of the lack of fire sprinkler systems,
> Geoff Wilkinson, the building regulations columnist for the Architects'
> Journal, wrote on 14 June 2017 that if a gas riser was leaking or the
> cladding was at fault, sprinklers would have had little effect. He also
> said that reports of combustible material stored in the common walkways
> suggested poor overall management.[281] David Siber, an advisor to the
> Fire Brigades Union, said sprinklers would have prevented the fire, if
> it started in a kitchen, from ever spreading beyond that room.[282]"
>
>
> As Tim says, there's a major issue about supplying water to sprinklers
> in all the flats at the same time.
>
> To put that in perspective, each sprinkler needs around 35-40 litres of
> water per minute. You need two sprinklers per room, so say 350 l/min for
> each flat.
>
> A dry riser, with water pumped from one or two fire engines, can supply
> around 1200 l/min, ie less than enough for 4 flats. So, to power all the
> sprinklers in Grenfell at once, would have required over 30 dry risers
> (they'd actually have to be wet risers), 30 high power pumps, simply
> massive water mains, major electricity supplies etc. It clearly would be
> hopelessly impracticable.
>
> Of course, the hope is that the sprinkler would have put the original
> fire out without it spreading to the cladding. But, if it had spread to
> the cladding, no practical sprinkler system would have helped.


You may be right, but possibly sprinklers would have reduced the fierce
temperatures on the upper floors to make it a bit easier for residents
to leave their flats and make the long descent down the narrow
staircase. I don't know if perhaps sprinklers also damp down some of the
smoke particles to improve visibility.
Martin Brown
2018-06-13 10:36:24 UTC
Permalink
On 08/06/2018 14:18, JNugent wrote:
> On 08/06/2018 12:55, The Todal wrote:
>
> [ ... ]
>
>> So far, nobody appears to have admitted blame, which is to be expected.
>> Each party is likely to blame another party or another factor.  I'm not
>> saying that this opinion will prevail over the opinions of independent
>> experts. The Hackitt Report says that the current regulatory system for
>> ensuring fire safety is not fit for purpose. If that's true, it implies
>> that the regulations are sufficiently ambiguous and have sufficient
>> loopholes that it might be possible to argue that you have complied,
>> even though your building is actually unsafe.
>
> If you *have* complied, it should certainly be possible to argue that
> you have complied.
>
> That's what compliance is.

It will be interesting to see what they have to say.
>
> The safety of the building is strictly a secondary matter.

Although it shouldn't be if the regulations are right.

>>> because the conclusion that they came to (based upon the enquiry) was
>>> that the cladding, as installed, most definitely did not meet the
>>> required standards.  It was way way short of the requirements.
>
>>> It's that "as installed" part that important here.  It exonerates the
>>> cladding manufacturer from blame, but not the rest of the process.
>
> There must presumably be a lawful purpose for which those tiles would be
> used. That they were bought and used for another purpose is hardly the
> maker's fault.

It wasn't illegal in the UK for manufacturers to sell them for cladding
a high rise building but it was certainly unethical for them to do so.
(they are banned in other parts of the world)

The question that arises is why do we have third world fire safety
standards for the refurbishment of flats in a first world country?

--
Regards,
Martin Brown
Tim Woodall
2018-06-08 13:10:44 UTC
Permalink
On 2018-06-08, The Todal <***@icloud.com> wrote:
>
> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
> the economics of a sprinkler system.
>

In this case, I don't think sprinklers were likely to have helped. Once
the fire spread to the outside, they wouldn't have stopped it spreading.

As more and more flats caught fire and sprinklers activated, the water
pressure would have dropped meaning that only the lowest flats would get
any water. But all the loss of life was in the upper flats.

Sprinklers might have extended the time evacuation was possible, but the
time until the evacuate order was made would also have been longer.

If it hadn't been able to spread outside then I suspect it wouldn't even
have spread outside the kitchen of the affected flat let alone to other
flats.
tim...
2018-06-08 16:12:10 UTC
Permalink
"Tim Woodall" <***@woodall.me.uk> wrote in message
news:***@einstein.home.woodall.me.uk...
> On 2018-06-08, The Todal <***@icloud.com> wrote:
>>
>> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
>> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
>> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
>> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
>> the economics of a sprinkler system.
>>
>
> In this case, I don't think sprinklers were likely to have helped. Once
> the fire spread to the outside, they wouldn't have stopped it spreading.
>
> As more and more flats caught fire and sprinklers activated, the water
> pressure would have dropped meaning that only the lowest flats would get
> any water. But all the loss of life was in the upper flats.

surely that's an inevitable failure mode of a sprinkler system

which you solve by taking the water to the top flats first and feeding the
lower flats as you take the pipe downwards from this point

rather than feeding the flats at the bottom as you take the pipe up the
building

tim
GB
2018-06-09 09:44:21 UTC
Permalink
On 08/06/2018 17:12, tim... wrote:
>
>
> "Tim Woodall" <***@woodall.me.uk> wrote in message
> news:***@einstein.home.woodall.me.uk...
>> On 2018-06-08, The Todal <***@icloud.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
>>> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
>>> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
>>> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
>>> the economics of a sprinkler system.
>>>
>>
>> In this case, I don't think sprinklers were likely to have helped. Once
>> the fire spread to the outside, they wouldn't have stopped it spreading.
>>
>> As more and more flats caught fire and sprinklers activated, the water
>> pressure would have dropped meaning that only the lowest flats would get
>> any water. But all the loss of life was in the upper flats.
>
> surely that's an inevitable failure mode of a sprinkler system
>
> which you solve by taking the water to the top flats first and feeding
> the lower flats as you take the pipe downwards from this point

The pressure at the bottom of the pipe will always be greater than at
the top, and most of the water will emerge at lower levels. That could
be solved with suitable pressure regulating valves, but if you had those
it wouldn't matter whether you served the distribution pipework from the
top or bottom.

What's more of an issue is the quantity of water needed to serve all the
sprinklers at the same time. It's not practicable, as I explained in a
different post.



>
> rather than feeding the flats at the bottom as you take the pipe up the
> building
>
> tim
>
>
>
pensive hamster
2018-06-09 18:34:32 UTC
Permalink
On Saturday, 9 June 2018 10:44:25 UTC+1, GB wrote:
[...]
> What's more of an issue is the quantity of water needed to serve all the
> sprinklers at the same time. It's not practicable, as I explained in a
> different post.

But presumably you wouldn't usually need to serve all the sprinklers
at the same time. If you did, the whole building would be on fire, and
it would already be too late, and the sprinkler system would have
failed to do its job.

I would have thought that a sprinkler system would be designed to
damp down a fire at its source, and prevent it taking hold and
spreading. Or at the very least, to slow down the spread
considerably, if the amount of combustible material was too great
for the sprinkler system to overcome.
GB
2018-06-09 18:47:38 UTC
Permalink
On 09/06/2018 19:34, pensive hamster wrote:
> On Saturday, 9 June 2018 10:44:25 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> [...]
>> What's more of an issue is the quantity of water needed to serve all the
>> sprinklers at the same time. It's not practicable, as I explained in a
>> different post.
>
> But presumably you wouldn't usually need to serve all the sprinklers
> at the same time. If you did, the whole building would be on fire, and
> it would already be too late, and the sprinkler system would have
> failed to do its job.

I agree. If a sprinkler had put the original fire out before it spread
to the cladding, there wouldn't have been a problem.

Likewise, if the windows had prevented the fire spreading outside into
the cladding. And likewise, if the specifier had used non-flammable
cladding. And likewise, if the building had been evacuated during the
first 45 minutes ...


> I would have thought that a sprinkler system would be designed to
> damp down a fire at its source, and prevent it taking hold and
> spreading. Or at the very least, to slow down the spread
> considerably, if the amount of combustible material was too great
> for the sprinkler system to overcome.
>

Do the sprinklers still use wax/plastic plugs to hold the water back?
Those melt, but only once the fire is pretty intense. The water then
dispensed is only about 5% of the amount the fire brigade spray once
they arrive.

The FB had no problem putting the fire out in the original flat.
pensive hamster
2018-06-09 19:48:48 UTC
Permalink
On Saturday, 9 June 2018 19:47:42 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> On 09/06/2018 19:34, pensive hamster wrote:
> > On Saturday, 9 June 2018 10:44:25 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> > [...]
> >> What's more of an issue is the quantity of water needed to serve all the
> >> sprinklers at the same time. It's not practicable, as I explained in a
> >> different post.
> >
> > But presumably you wouldn't usually need to serve all the sprinklers
> > at the same time. If you did, the whole building would be on fire, and
> > it would already be too late, and the sprinkler system would have
> > failed to do its job.
>
> I agree. If a sprinkler had put the original fire out before it spread
> to the cladding, there wouldn't have been a problem.
>
> Likewise, if the windows had prevented the fire spreading outside into
> the cladding. And likewise, if the specifier had used non-flammable
> cladding. And likewise, if the building had been evacuated during the
> first 45 minutes ...

So the OP had it pretty much right with their thread title...

> > I would have thought that a sprinkler system would be designed to
> > damp down a fire at its source, and prevent it taking hold and
> > spreading. Or at the very least, to slow down the spread
> > considerably, if the amount of combustible material was too great
> > for the sprinkler system to overcome.
> >
>
> Do the sprinklers still use wax/plastic plugs to hold the water back?
> Those melt, but only once the fire is pretty intense. The water then
> dispensed is only about 5% of the amount the fire brigade spray once
> they arrive.

Wikipedia comes to the rescue:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_sprinkler

'... In buildings protected by properly designed and maintained fire sprinklers,
over 99% of fires were controlled by fire sprinklers alone.[1][2][3]'

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_sprinkler#Operation

'Each closed-head sprinkler is held closed by either a heat-sensitive glass bulb
(see below) or a two-part metal link held together with a fusible alloy such as
Wood's metal[12] and other alloys with similar compositions.[13]...Because each
sprinkler activates independently when the predetermined heat level is reached,
the number of sprinklers that operate is limited to only those near the fire,
thereby maximizing the available water pressure over the point of fire origin.

'The bulb breaks as a result of the thermal expansion of the liquid inside the bulb.[14]
... Under standard testing procedures (135 °C air at a velocity of 2.5 m/s),
a 68 °C sprinkler bulb will break within 7 to 33 seconds, depending on the RTI.[16] '

> The FB had no problem putting the fire out in the original flat.
GB
2018-06-10 08:19:39 UTC
Permalink
On 09/06/2018 20:48, pensive hamster wrote:

> So the OP had it pretty much right with their thread title...

Yes.

>
> Wikipedia comes to the rescue:
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_sprinkler
>
> '... In buildings protected by properly designed and maintained fire sprinklers,
> over 99% of fires were controlled by fire sprinklers alone.[1][2][3]'

That's interesting. I heard that this particular fridge used butane as a
refrigerant, about 500 mls. That's quite a bit of lighter fluid, and ofc
the fridge itself is made of plastic that burns nicely. There was a
second fridge nearby, as well. So, possibly, this would have been in
the 1%, anyway.

Reducing the risk of a conflagration like Grenfell by 99% is not really
all that helpful, in any case. It could have been reduced by 100% by
using sensible cladding.


>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_sprinkler#Operation
>
> 'Each closed-head sprinkler is held closed by either a heat-sensitive glass bulb
> (see below) or a two-part metal link held together with a fusible alloy such as
> Wood's metal[12] and other alloys with similar compositions.[13]...Because each
> sprinkler activates independently when the predetermined heat level is reached,
> the number of sprinklers that operate is limited to only those near the fire,
> thereby maximizing the available water pressure over the point of fire origin.
>
> 'The bulb breaks as a result of the thermal expansion of the liquid inside the bulb.[14]
> ... Under standard testing procedures (135 °C air at a velocity of 2.5 m/s),
> a 68 °C sprinkler bulb will break within 7 to 33 seconds, depending on the RTI.[16] '

Thanks. Interesting.
harry
2018-06-14 05:42:49 UTC
Permalink
On Saturday, 9 June 2018 19:47:42 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> On 09/06/2018 19:34, pensive hamster wrote:
> > On Saturday, 9 June 2018 10:44:25 UTC+1, GB wrote:
> > [...]
> >> What's more of an issue is the quantity of water needed to serve all the
> >> sprinklers at the same time. It's not practicable, as I explained in a
> >> different post.
> >
> > But presumably you wouldn't usually need to serve all the sprinklers
> > at the same time. If you did, the whole building would be on fire, and
> > it would already be too late, and the sprinkler system would have
> > failed to do its job.
>
> I agree. If a sprinkler had put the original fire out before it spread
> to the cladding, there wouldn't have been a problem.
>
> Likewise, if the windows had prevented the fire spreading outside into
> the cladding. And likewise, if the specifier had used non-flammable
> cladding. And likewise, if the building had been evacuated during the
> first 45 minutes ...
>
>
> > I would have thought that a sprinkler system would be designed to
> > damp down a fire at its source, and prevent it taking hold and
> > spreading. Or at the very least, to slow down the spread
> > considerably, if the amount of combustible material was too great
> > for the sprinkler system to overcome.
> >
>
> Do the sprinklers still use wax/plastic plugs to hold the water back?
> Those melt, but only once the fire is pretty intense. The water then
> dispensed is only about 5% of the amount the fire brigade spray once
> they arrive.
>
> The FB had no problem putting the fire out in the original flat.

They have never had those.
They have an alcohol filled capsule that bursts at low temperatures.

They are very prone to vandalism which can cause massive damage.
Martin Brown
2018-06-13 10:35:55 UTC
Permalink
On 08/06/2018 14:10, Tim Woodall wrote:
> On 2018-06-08, The Todal <***@icloud.com> wrote:
>>
>> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
>> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
>> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the
>> number of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider
>> the economics of a sprinkler system.
>>
>
> In this case, I don't think sprinklers were likely to have helped. Once
> the fire spread to the outside, they wouldn't have stopped it spreading.

It could have made quite a difference in that the fire would have been
unable to spread sideways in the early stages since each adjacent room
to the kitchen window would be drenched. That is what happened in the
Australia fire (although the sprinkler system was at >250% overload it
won). It holds good until the sprinkler system becomes so overloaded
that the higher flats simply don't get enough water feed to work.

Once the fire reached the crown then the building would still have been
doomed but it would have burned a more slowly giving the firefighters a
bit more time to think and get more people out safely.

> As more and more flats caught fire and sprinklers activated, the water
> pressure would have dropped meaning that only the lowest flats would get
> any water. But all the loss of life was in the upper flats.
>
> Sprinklers might have extended the time evacuation was possible, but the
> time until the evacuate order was made would also have been longer.
>
> If it hadn't been able to spread outside then I suspect it wouldn't even
> have spread outside the kitchen of the affected flat let alone to other
> flats.

It was the very rapid spread of the fire that did the real damage. The
fire brigade were expecting a building that was designed to be
externally inert and with intrinsically safe comparmentalised flats -
what they found was an unmitigated fire disaster that beggars belief.

The really serious question is "how did we come to end up with third
world fire safety standards for refurbishment in a first world country?"

--
Regards,
Martin Brown
GB
2018-06-13 13:37:18 UTC
Permalink
On 13/06/2018 11:35, Martin Brown wrote:

> The really serious question is "how did we come to end up with third
> world fire safety standards for refurbishment in a first world country?"
>

I suspect that the enquiry will show that the standards were okay, but
not adhered to.
The Todal
2018-06-14 13:26:45 UTC
Permalink
On 13/06/2018 14:37, GB wrote:
> On 13/06/2018 11:35, Martin Brown wrote:
>
>> The really serious question is "how did we come to end up with third
>> world fire safety standards for refurbishment in a first world country?"
>>
>
> I suspect that the enquiry will show that the standards were okay, but
> not adhered to.


Gaps around windows which allowed draughts in - I wonder who signed off
that work as complete and compliant with the tender?

It's a pity that the inquiry is scheduled to take so long - many months.
I've listened to some of the opening statements with considerable
interest. The lawyers who represent the tenants unfortunately speak at
great length and very passionately as if their aim is to impress their
clients without actually telling us anything new. But the other lawyers,
including the lawyer for Mr Kebede (the tenant of Flat 16 where the fire
started), gave useful information and corrected some of the errors made
in the press.

The video stream is here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sif_OPHblCQ
R. Mark Clayton
2018-06-14 14:01:30 UTC
Permalink
On Thursday, 14 June 2018 14:26:48 UTC+1, The Todal wrote:
> On 13/06/2018 14:37, GB wrote:
> > On 13/06/2018 11:35, Martin Brown wrote:
> >
> >> The really serious question is "how did we come to end up with third
> >> world fire safety standards for refurbishment in a first world country?"
> >>
> >
> > I suspect that the enquiry will show that the standards were okay, but
> > not adhered to.
>
>
> Gaps around windows which allowed draughts in - I wonder who signed off
> that work as complete and compliant with the tender?

Probably filled with foam of some sort - stops draughts - lets in fire :-(

>
> It's a pity that the inquiry is scheduled to take so long - many months.
> I've listened to some of the opening statements with considerable
> interest. The lawyers who represent the tenants unfortunately speak at
> great length and very passionately as if their aim is to impress their
> clients without actually telling us anything new.

They have little access to new fact, but are trying to ensure that those responsible do not wriggle out of civil and possibly criminal liability.


> But the other lawyers,
> including the lawyer for Mr Kebede (the tenant of Flat 16 where the fire
> started), gave useful information and corrected some of the errors made
> in the press.
>
> The video stream is here:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sif_OPHblCQ
Altroy1
2018-06-10 16:58:32 UTC
Permalink
Yellow
2018-06-07 13:28:50 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 7 Jun 2018 08:12:02 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
posted:
>
> "Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
> news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> > On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 20:09:00 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
> > posted:
> >>
> >> "Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
> >> news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> >> > On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 02:55:13 -0700 (PDT), R. Mark Clayton
> >> > <***@gmail.com> posted:
> >> >>
> >> >> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
> >> >> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming
> >> >> > the
> >> >> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to
> >> >> > have
> >> >> > been caused by more than one thing?
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in
> >> >> > tower
> >> >> > blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents
> >> >> > 'staying
> >> >> > put' in flats.
> >> >>
> >> >> Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and
> >> >> only
> >> >> four storeys).
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> > 2. No sprinklers.
> >> >>
> >> >> Not a requirement.
> >> >
> >> > You are missing the point of the list, which is about the reason why
> >> > what happened happened with a view to altering the law.
> >>
> >> not really
> >
> > Yes really.
>
> No, really.
>
> >> the non-requirement for sprinklers is because it is considered that the
> >> rest
> >> of the Building Regs make the building safe from a fire.
> >
> > Except the rest of the building, on the day, was not safe - was it?
>
> The building didn't have sprinklers installed by design, because it was safe
> without them, by design.
>
> It was the alterations made to it that were unsafe.
>
> It is nonsense to argue that you can "make unsafe alterations to a building
> if you retro-install a sprinkler system"
>
> The solution ought to be "you can only make alterations to a building that
> are safe"
>
> > Regulations are all well and good but the only way to be sure a
> > particular building will not burn or a particular fire will not spread
> > is to set fire to it and see what happens
>
> well now you are arguing that unmodified buildings, building to current
> controlled standards might be unsafe.
>
> there is no evidence to support that. There have been previous fires in
> high rise apartments and the "containment" process has worked as designed.
>
> > - which of course cannot be
> > done. This is why you have to consider other measures, even if on paper
> > they would appear superfluous.
>
> It might be a good idea to consider other methods, but that doesn't mean
> that you can flag up "lack of sprinkles" as a fault if the current methods
> have been proven to work.
>
> tim
>

I can only repeat that the point is the other measures did not work and
people died. That is why it is right to look at whether other systems
need to be added to buildings to deal with such circumstance.

Saying "well they should have worked" does not cut it.
tim...
2018-06-07 13:47:58 UTC
Permalink
"Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> On Thu, 7 Jun 2018 08:12:02 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
> posted:
>>
>>
>> It might be a good idea to consider other methods, but that doesn't mean
>> that you can flag up "lack of sprinkles" as a fault if the current
>> methods
>> have been proven to work.
>>
>> tim
>>
>
> I can only repeat that the point is the other measures did not work and
> people died. That is why it is right to look at whether other systems
> need to be added to buildings to deal with such circumstance.
>
> Saying "well they should have worked" does not cut it.

I'm not saying "they should have worked"

I am saying the remedy is to change the way that modifications are checked -
to ensure that they really do leave the property safe, because that was what
was deficient here.

The simplest solution to proving that you are keeping the building safe here
is to use non-flammable panels. That would cost more, but I can't believe
that it's going to be more expensive than allowing flammable panels plus
fitting sprinklers.

and the problem with suggestion fitting sprinklers as the solution, is that
the belt and braces solution of fitting them to *every* block whether they
have had safe alterations done or not will be chosen. And you and I
ratepayer will be paying for it.

tim





>
Yellow
2018-06-07 16:52:42 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 7 Jun 2018 14:47:58 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
posted:
>
> "Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
> news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> > On Thu, 7 Jun 2018 08:12:02 +0100, tim... <***@yahoo.com>
> > posted:
> >>
> >>
> >> It might be a good idea to consider other methods, but that doesn't mean
> >> that you can flag up "lack of sprinkles" as a fault if the current
> >> methods
> >> have been proven to work.
> >>
> >> tim
> >>
> >
> > I can only repeat that the point is the other measures did not work and
> > people died. That is why it is right to look at whether other systems
> > need to be added to buildings to deal with such circumstance.
> >
> > Saying "well they should have worked" does not cut it.
>
> I'm not saying "they should have worked"
>
> I am saying the remedy is to change the way that modifications are checked -
> to ensure that they really do leave the property safe, because that was what
> was deficient here.

I am just not convinced that is possible and can cite loads of examples
of things that were supposed to have been done 'properly' but proved not
to have been so when a failure was subsequently investigated.

And you then on top have the added extra of later modifications, both
official and unofficial.


> The simplest solution to proving that you are keeping the building safe here
> is to use non-flammable panels. That would cost more, but I can't believe
> that it's going to be more expensive than allowing flammable panels plus
> fitting sprinklers.

How would you prove each of the panels was inert in all circumstances
and that the method used to fix them to the building was not a change
the nature of the building so as to create an unexpected hazard?

And this needs to be so across all building, panels from all
manufacturers and the methods of all installers.

That is the challenge.


> and the problem with suggestion fitting sprinklers as the solution,
> is that
> the belt and braces solution of fitting them to *every* block whether they
> have had safe alterations done or not will be chosen.

Not all blocks but perhaps blocks over a certain height. It needs to be
looked into and that is why sprinklers are on the list.


> And you and I
> ratepayer will be paying for it.

If tax payers are having to pay to add insulation to buildings then I
guess it follows we have to guarantee the residents safety.
harry
2018-06-08 14:48:38 UTC
Permalink
On Wednesday, 6 June 2018 20:10:27 UTC+1, tim... wrote:
> "Yellow" <***@none.com.invalid> wrote in message
> news:***@News.Individual.NET...
> > On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 02:55:13 -0700 (PDT), R. Mark Clayton
> > <***@gmail.com> posted:
> >>
> >> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:
> >> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming
> >> > the
> >> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> >> > been caused by more than one thing?
> >> >
> >> > 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
> >> > blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
> >> > put' in flats.
> >>
> >> Correct and still the right advice in my block (wet construction and only
> >> four storeys).
> >>
> >> >
> >> > 2. No sprinklers.
> >>
> >> Not a requirement.
> >
> > You are missing the point of the list, which is about the reason why
> > what happened happened with a view to altering the law.
>
> not really
>
> the non-requirement for sprinklers is because it is considered that the rest
> of the Building Regs make the building safe from a fire.


Sprinklers wouldn't have helped/ The fire spread up the outside of the building which was the main problem.

Also,big problem with kids vandalising them and causing massive damage.
tim...
2018-06-06 18:59:15 UTC
Permalink
"R. Mark Clayton" <***@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:3f0e0a0c-0ed7-4a6f-b0ee-***@googlegroups.com...
> On Tuesday, 5 June 2018 18:18:20 UTC+1, Yellow wrote:

>
>>
>> 26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
>> fire to spread more quickly.
>
> Occupiers tend to disconnect the closers as happens in my block.

Yep

The BR requirement to fit closures on internal doors has been rescinded
because occupants don't like them and instead tend to chock the door fully
open.

This means that instead of, a resident perhaps manually closing the door
when they go to bed, it always remains open 24/7.

Ergo, closures on internal doors in real world use have been show to do more
harm than good. The book-exercise theory that they are beneficial, proved
illusionary.

tim
The Todal
2018-06-06 11:47:16 UTC
Permalink
On 05/06/2018 18:18, Yellow wrote:
> Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming the
> cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> been caused by more than one thing?
>

snip

>
> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>

The Inquiry will have to decide whether that criticism is valid only in
hindsight - after all, how can the emergency services know that the fire
resistance of the individual flats was far less than expected? Or
whether the chances of survival are better if you stay put rather than
embark on a long descent of a staircase in choking black smoke?

Quote:


Buildings such as Grenfell Tower were expressly designed so as to
contain any fire in its compartment of origin for sufficient time to
allow the fire service to extinguish it before it has the chance to
spread. Accordingly, the building design is not intended to facilitate
simultaneous evacuation of residents, especially at the same time as
firefighting. There is no common fire alarm provided for that purpose
and the sole means of escape is by way of a single stairwell.

snip


The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic conditions.

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/London%20Fire%20Brigade%20opening%20statement.pdf
GB
2018-06-06 12:49:09 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 12:47, The Todal wrote:

> The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
> such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
> advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
> them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic conditions.

The control officer would by then have reports from firemen within the
block, so he wouldn't be entirely in the dark.


>
> https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/London%20Fire%20Brigade%20opening%20statement.pdf
>
The Todal
2018-06-06 13:22:21 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 13:49, GB wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 12:47, The Todal wrote:
>
>> The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
>> such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
>> advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
>> them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic conditions.
>
> The control officer would by then have reports from firemen within the
> block, so he wouldn't be entirely in the dark.
>

But what would the control officer have known, based on any such
reports? That will presumably be scrutinised carefully.

He may well have known that the fire was spreading in an uncontrolled
manner to other flats. And that people were trying to get down the
staircase and were collapsing and dying due to the smoke.




>
>>
>> https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/London%20Fire%20Brigade%20opening%20statement.pdf
>>
>
GB
2018-06-06 14:10:04 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 14:22, The Todal wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 13:49, GB wrote:
>> On 06/06/2018 12:47, The Todal wrote:
>>
>>> The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
>>> such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
>>> advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
>>> them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic
>>> conditions.
>>
>> The control officer would by then have reports from firemen within the
>> block, so he wouldn't be entirely in the dark.
>>
>
> But what would the control officer have known, based on any such
> reports?  That will presumably be scrutinised carefully.
>
> He may well have known that the fire was spreading in an uncontrolled
> manner to other flats. And that people were trying to get down the
> staircase and were collapsing and dying due to the smoke.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>> https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/London%20Fire%20Brigade%20opening%20statement.pdf
>>>
>>
>
GB
2018-06-06 14:13:35 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 14:22, The Todal wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 13:49, GB wrote:
>> On 06/06/2018 12:47, The Todal wrote:
>>
>>> The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
>>> such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
>>> advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
>>> them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic
>>> conditions.
>>
>> The control officer would by then have reports from firemen within the
>> block, so he wouldn't be entirely in the dark.
>>
>
> But what would the control officer have known, based on any such
> reports?  That will presumably be scrutinised carefully.
>
> He may well have known that the fire was spreading in an uncontrolled
> manner to other flats. And that people were trying to get down the
> staircase and were collapsing and dying due to the smoke.

Indeed. Hopefully, the enquiry will look for positive messages for
improvement, like the air crash investigations, rather than apportioning
blame.

I have no idea whether it exists, but possibly the fire brigades need to
have respirators suitable for civilians to use whilst descending through
smoke.
GB
2018-06-06 18:11:43 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 12:47, The Todal wrote:

>
> The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
> such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
> advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
> them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic conditions.

If you want an idea of conditions, read Dr Lane's report, section 14.4.
It's a bit harrowing.
Yellow
2018-06-06 20:54:02 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 6 Jun 2018 12:47:16 +0100, The Todal <***@icloud.com>
posted:
>
> On 05/06/2018 18:18, Yellow wrote:
> > Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming the
> > cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> > been caused by more than one thing?
> >
>
> snip
>
> >
> > 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> > within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> > adhered to for another 80 minutes.
> >
>
> The Inquiry will have to decide whether that criticism is valid only in
> hindsight

I believe that is the case with everything on the list as they are the
reasons why the fire spread like it did and the reasons why so many
people died.

Things are not excluded from the list because they were deemed correct
or lawful at the time the fire broke out.

But further, I was under the impression this "stay in your flat" advice
was only while the fire was contained - so I don't think they did heed
current best practice on the day but I am certainly no expert.


> - after all, how can the emergency services know that the fire
> resistance of the individual flats was far less than expected? Or
> whether the chances of survival are better if you stay put rather than
> embark on a long descent of a staircase in choking black smoke?
>
> Quote:
>
>
> Buildings such as Grenfell Tower were expressly designed so as to
> contain any fire in its compartment of origin for sufficient time to
> allow the fire service to extinguish it before it has the chance to
> spread. Accordingly, the building design is not intended to facilitate
> simultaneous evacuation of residents, especially at the same time as
> firefighting. There is no common fire alarm provided for that purpose
> and the sole means of escape is by way of a single stairwell.
>
> snip
>
>
> The appalling dilemma which control officers face in circumstances
> such as these is that they cannot know, when considering whether to
> advise residents to leave their flats, whether they may be directing
> them into dangerous, untenable and potentially lethally toxic conditions.
>
> https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/London%20Fire%20Brigade%20opening%20statement.pdf

It rather looks like the event was treated as if the fire was behaving
"as it was supposed to" instead of dealing with what was actually
happening but I am certainly not trying to be judgemental in saying that
as the enquiry has hardly started and I am sure there is more to come
out.
Omega
2018-06-06 19:20:47 UTC
Permalink
7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
adhered to for another 80 minutes.



This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!

omega











> Remember when we were discussing Grenfell, when everyone was blaming the
> cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
> been caused by more than one thing?
>
> 1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
> blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
> put' in flats.
>
> 2. No sprinklers.
>
> 3. Firefighters should have directed their hoses on or above the fire,
> but videos show they were being targeted below.
>
> 4. A pipe system to get water up the 24-storey block could not cope and
> was overloaded - leaving the upper floors, where most people died,
> vulnerable.
>
> 5. Water pipe failure meant fire crews had to pump their own water onto
> the fire.
>
> 6. The failure of the fire lift system delayed firefighters.
>
> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>
> 8. Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled
> 'substantially to blame'.
>
> 9. Two types of cladding and four different insulation layers did not
> comply with building regulations.
>
> 10. Two cavity barriers did not have the required fire performance
> certificates.
>
> 11. The cladding produced toxic smoke that slowed the firefighters as it
> forced them to wear breathing apparatus.
>
> 12. Designers and builders had no idea how the cladding system would
> perform in a fire as no tests were carried out.
>
> 13. Neither the London Fire Brigade nor Kensington and Chelsea Tenant
> Management Organisation, which was responsible for Grenfell, carried out
> risk assessments of the cladding.
>
> 14. Flammable aluminium panels fixed to the tower and on more than 300
> other blocks across England were never subjected to a full British
> Standard fire test.
>
> 15. Stairwell was too narrow and soon became impassable thanks to smoke,
> darkness, firefighters and distressed and dying victims.
>
> 16. An architectural feature called a 'crown' at the top of the building
> caught fire and also helped the blaze spread horizontally.
>
> 17. Design of tower blocks is supposed to 'compartmentalise' fires into
> individual flats - but this was not effective at Grenfell.
>
> 18. Ventilation system for removing smoke from lobbies failed.
>
> 19. Fire stops between each floor were not installed correctly, meaning
> nothing stopped the blaze leaping up the tower.
>
> 20. A 'culture of non-compliance' appeared to exist in the maintenance
> of the tower.
>
> 21. Most of the fire doors leading to the 120 flats were relatively new
> but did not comply with building regulations.
>
> 22. Some doors failed within 20 minutes even though they should have
> blocked fire for an hour.
>
> 23. Doors were fitted with a variety of different locks, hinges and
> letter plates that could significantly reduce fire resistance.
>
> 24. Forty-eight doors had glazing that failed and allowed flames and
> smoke to pass directly through.
>
> 25. Fourteen of the doors to Grenfell's flats were of unknown origin.
>
> 26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
> fire to spread more quickly.
>
> 27. Doors were left open by fire hoses and in one case, a body.
>
> 28. Defective windows installed in the 2012-16 refurbishment allowed the
> fire to spread from a single kitchen to the external cladding through
> gaps in frames.
>
> 29. Windows had no fire-resistant cavity barriers encasing them and
> these openings were surrounded by combustible material.
>
> 30. During refurbishment, the windows were fitted in an 'improvised
> manner' that may have made them less safe.
>
The Todal
2018-06-06 22:10:55 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 20:20, Omega wrote:
>
> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>
>
>
> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
>

Not true.

From the expert evidence of Dr Lane:


It is my opinion that the conditions of the stairs and lobbies would
have created intense fear amongst the residents which is likely to have
affected the ability of many of them to leave their flat and descend the
stair, even when they were eventually instructed to do so.

The fire fighters had breathing apparatus. The residents had nothing to
aid them.

There were other signals of danger to residents, and to firefighters,
including incapacitated or deceased residents in lobbies or the stairs,
large quantities of thick smoke impacting sight and breathing
immediately outside flat entrance doors, intense heat outside flat
entrance doors ...
Omega
2018-06-07 08:20:42 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 23:10, The Todal wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 20:20, Omega wrote:
>>
>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>>
>>
>>
>> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
>>
>
> Not true.
>
> From the expert evidence of Dr Lane:
>
>
> It is my opinion that the conditions of the stairs and lobbies would
> have created intense fear amongst the residents which is likely to have
> affected the ability of many of them to leave their flat and descend the
> stair, even when they were eventually instructed to do so.
>
> The fire fighters had breathing apparatus. The residents had nothing to
> aid them.
>
> There were other signals of danger to residents, and to firefighters,
> including incapacitated or deceased residents in lobbies or the stairs,
> large quantities of thick smoke impacting sight and breathing
> immediately outside flat entrance doors, intense heat outside flat
> entrance doors ...
>


From my recall, some residents phoned the fire service within minutes
of the fire outbreak to report smoke and all were advised NOT to vacate
from what was still a sound building, as the service would be along soon
to 'save' them. Was this fake news at the time?

They failed, they didn't save them! They perished where many could have
simply left the building before the fire took a hold!

As an aside, a friend of mine who lives in a bungalow, sought free
advice from the fire service sometime last year and was advised, in the
event of a fire outbreak, close all doors and sit tight as the service
would be quick to attend and save her. "But I live on the ground, I
could climb from a window anywhere in my home". The advisor insisted
she should stay put and wait for the service as she could break a leg in
her panic to escape.

This 'Stay Put Policy' has been advice from the service nationally for a
year or two now.

Just watch this policy change after this enquiry is finished and events
settle down.

omega
The Todal
2018-06-07 09:07:49 UTC
Permalink
On 07/06/2018 09:20, Omega wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 23:10, The Todal wrote:
>> On 06/06/2018 20:20, Omega wrote:
>>>
>>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
>>>
>>
>> Not true.
>>
>>  From the expert evidence of Dr Lane:
>>
>>
>> It is my opinion that the conditions of the stairs and lobbies would
>> have created intense fear amongst the residents which is likely to
>> have affected the ability of many of them to leave their flat and
>> descend the stair, even when they were eventually instructed to do so.
>>
>> The fire fighters had breathing apparatus. The residents had nothing
>> to aid them.
>>
>> There were other signals of danger to residents, and to firefighters,
>> including incapacitated or deceased residents in lobbies or the
>> stairs, large quantities of thick smoke impacting sight and breathing
>> immediately outside flat entrance doors, intense heat outside flat
>> entrance doors ...
>>
>
>
> From my recall, some residents phoned the fire service within minutes
> of the fire outbreak to report smoke and all were advised NOT to vacate
> from what was still a sound building, as the service would be along soon
> to 'save' them.  Was this fake news at the time?
>
> They failed, they didn't save them!  They perished where many could have
> simply left the building before the fire took a hold!
>
> As an aside, a friend of mine who lives in a bungalow, sought free
> advice from the fire service sometime last year and was advised, in the
> event of a fire outbreak, close all doors and sit tight as the service
> would be quick to attend and save her.  "But I live on the ground, I
> could climb from a window anywhere in my home".  The advisor insisted
> she should stay put and wait for the service as she could break a leg in
> her panic to escape.
>
> This 'Stay Put Policy' has been advice from the service nationally for a
> year or two now.
>
> Just watch this policy change after this enquiry is finished and events
> settle down.
>

I think you are mistaken. It's clear from the expert evidence that the
building was designed on the basis that in a fire, residents could
safely stay put. That was part of the design, not merely advice from the
fire brigade. The building was not designed to permit all the residents
to evacuate the building using the one rather narrow staircase, in what
turned out to be pitch darkness with choking smoke.

The policy won't change, in respect of buildings that have been
correctly designed, built and maintained.
plop
2018-06-07 12:21:56 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 07 Jun 2018 10:07:49 +0100, The Todal wrote:

> On 07/06/2018 09:20, Omega wrote:
>> On 06/06/2018 23:10, The Todal wrote:
>>> On 06/06/2018 20:20, Omega wrote:
>>>>
>>>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>>>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>>>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Not true.
>>>
>>>  From the expert evidence of Dr Lane:
>>>
>>>
>>> It is my opinion that the conditions of the stairs and lobbies would
>>> have created intense fear amongst the residents which is likely to
>>> have affected the ability of many of them to leave their flat and
>>> descend the stair, even when they were eventually instructed to do so.
>>>
>>> The fire fighters had breathing apparatus. The residents had nothing
>>> to aid them.
>>>
>>> There were other signals of danger to residents, and to firefighters,
>>> including incapacitated or deceased residents in lobbies or the
>>> stairs, large quantities of thick smoke impacting sight and breathing
>>> immediately outside flat entrance doors, intense heat outside flat
>>> entrance doors ...
>>>
>>>
>>
>> From my recall, some residents phoned the fire service within minutes
>> of the fire outbreak to report smoke and all were advised NOT to vacate
>> from what was still a sound building, as the service would be along
>> soon to 'save' them.  Was this fake news at the time?
>>
>> They failed, they didn't save them!  They perished where many could
>> have simply left the building before the fire took a hold!
>>
>> As an aside, a friend of mine who lives in a bungalow, sought free
>> advice from the fire service sometime last year and was advised, in the
>> event of a fire outbreak, close all doors and sit tight as the service
>> would be quick to attend and save her.  "But I live on the ground, I
>> could climb from a window anywhere in my home".  The advisor insisted
>> she should stay put and wait for the service as she could break a leg
>> in her panic to escape.
>>
>> This 'Stay Put Policy' has been advice from the service nationally for
>> a year or two now.
>>
>> Just watch this policy change after this enquiry is finished and events
>> settle down.
>>
>>
> I think you are mistaken. It's clear from the expert evidence that the
> building was designed on the basis that in a fire, residents could
> safely stay put. That was part of the design, not merely advice from the
> fire brigade. The building was not designed to permit all the residents
> to evacuate the building using the one rather narrow staircase, in what
> turned out to be pitch darkness with choking smoke.
>
> The policy won't change, in respect of buildings that have been
> correctly designed, built and maintained.


Why do hotels exercise an evacuation when the fire alarm goes off ?
Yellow
2018-06-07 13:30:30 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 7 Jun 2018 12:21:56 -0000 (UTC), plop <***@pd.org> posted:
>
> On Thu, 07 Jun 2018 10:07:49 +0100, The Todal wrote:
>
> > On 07/06/2018 09:20, Omega wrote:
> >> On 06/06/2018 23:10, The Todal wrote:
> >>> On 06/06/2018 20:20, Omega wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> >>>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> >>>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> Not true.
> >>>
> >>>  From the expert evidence of Dr Lane:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> It is my opinion that the conditions of the stairs and lobbies would
> >>> have created intense fear amongst the residents which is likely to
> >>> have affected the ability of many of them to leave their flat and
> >>> descend the stair, even when they were eventually instructed to do so.
> >>>
> >>> The fire fighters had breathing apparatus. The residents had nothing
> >>> to aid them.
> >>>
> >>> There were other signals of danger to residents, and to firefighters,
> >>> including incapacitated or deceased residents in lobbies or the
> >>> stairs, large quantities of thick smoke impacting sight and breathing
> >>> immediately outside flat entrance doors, intense heat outside flat
> >>> entrance doors ...
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >> From my recall, some residents phoned the fire service within minutes
> >> of the fire outbreak to report smoke and all were advised NOT to vacate
> >> from what was still a sound building, as the service would be along
> >> soon to 'save' them.  Was this fake news at the time?
> >>
> >> They failed, they didn't save them!  They perished where many could
> >> have simply left the building before the fire took a hold!
> >>
> >> As an aside, a friend of mine who lives in a bungalow, sought free
> >> advice from the fire service sometime last year and was advised, in the
> >> event of a fire outbreak, close all doors and sit tight as the service
> >> would be quick to attend and save her.  "But I live on the ground, I
> >> could climb from a window anywhere in my home".  The advisor insisted
> >> she should stay put and wait for the service as she could break a leg
> >> in her panic to escape.
> >>
> >> This 'Stay Put Policy' has been advice from the service nationally for
> >> a year or two now.
> >>
> >> Just watch this policy change after this enquiry is finished and events
> >> settle down.
> >>
> >>
> > I think you are mistaken. It's clear from the expert evidence that the
> > building was designed on the basis that in a fire, residents could
> > safely stay put. That was part of the design, not merely advice from the
> > fire brigade. The building was not designed to permit all the residents
> > to evacuate the building using the one rather narrow staircase, in what
> > turned out to be pitch darkness with choking smoke.
> >
> > The policy won't change, in respect of buildings that have been
> > correctly designed, built and maintained.
>
>
> Why do hotels exercise an evacuation when the fire alarm goes off ?

It is down to the design of the building.
GB
2018-06-07 11:06:18 UTC
Permalink
On 06/06/2018 23:10, The Todal wrote:
> On 06/06/2018 20:20, Omega wrote:
>>
>> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
>> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
>> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>>
>>
>>
>> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
>>
>
> Not true.
>
> From the expert evidence of Dr Lane:
>
>
> It is my opinion that the conditions of the stairs and lobbies would
> have created intense fear amongst the residents which is likely to have
> affected the ability of many of them to leave their flat and descend the
> stair, even when they were eventually instructed to do so.
>

You're quoting too selective, Todal. Dr Lane says that the stairs were
clear of smoke at 1.40, ie 45 minutes after the original call to the
fire brigade.

She gives a chart relating to the residents in the flats vertically
above flat 16 and she shows that many made it out of the building
safely. Most of them reached the ground floor around 1.20. The reason is
presumably that the fire spread upwards first, and they could see the
flames outside their windows. No way were they going to hang around!
Figure 20.8.

Some residents were evacuated from the 21st floor as late as 3.50.


> The fire fighters had breathing apparatus. The residents had nothing to
> aid them.
>
> There were other signals of danger to residents, and to firefighters,
> including incapacitated or deceased residents in lobbies or the stairs,
> large quantities of thick smoke impacting sight and breathing
> immediately outside flat entrance doors, intense heat outside flat
> entrance doors ...
>
tim...
2018-06-07 07:00:45 UTC
Permalink
"Omega" <***@last.com> wrote in message news:pf9c6d$uge$***@dont-email.me...
>
> 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> adhered to for another 80 minutes.
>
>
>
> This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!

no it wasn't

a) had the fire not spread due to the poorly speced cladding, no-one at all
would have died.

b) We are still lacking the evidence that , if people were told to evacuate,
that they would have made it to the outside before being overcome by smoke
and collapsed on the stairwell. You are assuming that they would. This is
some suggestion that they would not.

tim
R. Mark Clayton
2018-06-07 09:42:33 UTC
Permalink
On Thursday, 7 June 2018 08:02:11 UTC+1, tim... wrote:
> "Omega" <***@last.com> wrote in message news:pf9c6d$uge$***@dont-email.me...
> >
> > 7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
> > within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
> > adhered to for another 80 minutes.
> >
> >
> >
> > This was the *ONLY* reason so many died in this fire!
>
> no it wasn't
>
> a) had the fire not spread due to the poorly speced cladding, no-one at all
> would have died.
>
> b) We are still lacking the evidence that , if people were told to evacuate,
> that they would have made it to the outside before being overcome by smoke
> and collapsed on the stairwell. You are assuming that they would. This is
> some suggestion that they would not.
>
> tim

A) true along with badly refitted windows with gaps.

B) The decision had to be made early, which is why the inquiry was told that the opportunity had been lost within about half an hour, after that the stairwell was smoke logged and lethal without breathing apparatus.
Phi
2018-06-08 13:30:24 UTC
Permalink
"The Todal" <***@icloud.com> wrote in message
news:***@mid.individual.net...
> On 07/06/2018 12:58, tim... wrote:
>>
>>
>> "The Todal" <***@icloud.com> wrote in message
>> news:***@mid.individual.net...
>>> On 07/06/2018 08:12, tim... wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> well now you are arguing that unmodified buildings, building to current
>>>> controlled standards might be unsafe.
>>>>
>>>> there is no evidence to support that. There have been previous fires
>>>> in high rise apartments and the "containment" process has worked as
>>>> designed.
>>>
>>> I think it is likely to be argued that Grenfell Tower did comply with
>>> building regulations and that the cladding passed the relevant tests.
>>
>> you've not been watching the same TV analysis as me
>
>
> So far, nobody appears to have admitted blame, which is to be expected.
> Each party is likely to blame another party or another factor. I'm not
> saying that this opinion will prevail over the opinions of independent
> experts. The Hackitt Report says that the current regulatory system for
> ensuring fire safety is not fit for purpose. If that's true, it implies
> that the regulations are sufficiently ambiguous and have sufficient
> loopholes that it might be possible to argue that you have complied, even
> though your building is actually unsafe.
>
>>
>> because the conclusion that they came to (based upon the enquiry) was
>> that the cladding, as installed, most definitely did not meet the
>> required standards. It was way way short of the requirements.
>>
>> It's that "as installed" part that important here. It exonerates the
>> cladding manufacturer from blame, but not the rest of the process.
>
> "The company that made the combustible cladding used on Grenfell Tower has
> claimed its panels were not responsible for spreading the fire that killed
> 72 people, despite expert evidence to the contrary.
>
> Lawyers for the US industrial giant Arconic told the public inquiry on
> Tuesday that its panels, which could be seen burning and emitting showers
> of molten plastic from their cores, were “at most, a contributing
> factor”.
>
> They suggested no one would have died if the windows had been built with
> greater fire protection because they would have prevented the flames
> spreading."
>
> or to quote from the Arconic statement:
>
> "ACM is only one component in an overall cladding system.. The Company
> manufactures and sells unfabricated ACM panels; it does not sell other
> components of an overall cladding system. ...At relevant times there was
> no legal bar to the use of combustible materials within a cladding
> system."
>
> https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/evidence/arconic-architectural-products-sas-opening-statement
>
>
>>
>>> The inquiry will presumably reach a conclusion on that.
>>>
>>> What is clear from the evidence so far is that the staircase - the only
>>> staircase - was too narrow to allow two firement with breathing
>>> apparatus to pass each other, let alone if the staircase is obstructed
>>> with bodies or discarded equipment. Firemen were running out of air from
>>> their breathing apparatus before they had managed to get to the top of
>>> the staircase, or shortly afterwards.
>>>
>>> A sprinkler system, as a "belt and braces", would save lives in cases
>>> where the fire could not be confined to individual apartments.
>>
>> Of course
>>
>> and were they fitted as standard on all new builds could be very cost
>> effective.
>>
>> but they will not be cost effective if they need to be retro fitted.
>
> The Lakanal House fire in 2009 resulted in an urgent recommendation to
> consider retrofitting sprinkler systems in tower blocks. That was
> presumably ignored because of the cost. Once you establish that the number
> of deaths is likely to be embarrassing, you have to reconsider the
> economics of a sprinkler system.


......or strengthen your defence argument in a post event inquiry.


>
>
>
>
>>
>> These two propositions are entirely different (and here we will be
>> dealing with retro-fitting!)
>>
>>
>>
>
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