2018-06-05 17:18:19 UTC
cladding and baying for blood and I said wait as it will prove to have
been caused by more than one thing?
1. There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower
blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents 'staying
put' in flats.
2. No sprinklers.
3. Firefighters should have directed their hoses on or above the fire,
but videos show they were being targeted below.
4. A pipe system to get water up the 24-storey block could not cope and
was overloaded - leaving the upper floors, where most people died,
5. Water pipe failure meant fire crews had to pump their own water onto
6. The failure of the fire lift system delayed firefighters.
7. Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile
within half an hour of the blaze breaking out - but still slavishly
adhered to for another 80 minutes.
8. Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled
'substantially to blame'.
9. Two types of cladding and four different insulation layers did not
comply with building regulations.
10. Two cavity barriers did not have the required fire performance
11. The cladding produced toxic smoke that slowed the firefighters as it
forced them to wear breathing apparatus.
12. Designers and builders had no idea how the cladding system would
perform in a fire as no tests were carried out.
13. Neither the London Fire Brigade nor Kensington and Chelsea Tenant
Management Organisation, which was responsible for Grenfell, carried out
risk assessments of the cladding.
14. Flammable aluminium panels fixed to the tower and on more than 300
other blocks across England were never subjected to a full British
Standard fire test.
15. Stairwell was too narrow and soon became impassable thanks to smoke,
darkness, firefighters and distressed and dying victims.
16. An architectural feature called a 'crown' at the top of the building
caught fire and also helped the blaze spread horizontally.
17. Design of tower blocks is supposed to 'compartmentalise' fires into
individual flats - but this was not effective at Grenfell.
18. Ventilation system for removing smoke from lobbies failed.
19. Fire stops between each floor were not installed correctly, meaning
nothing stopped the blaze leaping up the tower.
20. A 'culture of non-compliance' appeared to exist in the maintenance
of the tower.
21. Most of the fire doors leading to the 120 flats were relatively new
but did not comply with building regulations.
22. Some doors failed within 20 minutes even though they should have
blocked fire for an hour.
23. Doors were fitted with a variety of different locks, hinges and
letter plates that could significantly reduce fire resistance.
24. Forty-eight doors had glazing that failed and allowed flames and
smoke to pass directly through.
25. Fourteen of the doors to Grenfell's flats were of unknown origin.
26. Some doors designed to 'self-close' failed to do so, allowing the
fire to spread more quickly.
27. Doors were left open by fire hoses and in one case, a body.
28. Defective windows installed in the 2012-16 refurbishment allowed the
fire to spread from a single kitchen to the external cladding through
gaps in frames.
29. Windows had no fire-resistant cavity barriers encasing them and
these openings were surrounded by combustible material.
30. During refurbishment, the windows were fitted in an 'improvised
manner' that may have made them less safe.